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Misrepresentation in Indiana: What Hath
Fraud Wrought?
Although the Indiana law of fraud' provides recovery for damages
resulting from the making of knowingly false statements with the intent to
mislead the representee, Indiana courts have extended like relief for negligent
misrepresentation. 2 This characterization removes actions for negligent
misrepresentation from the law of negligence, and places them under the law
of fraud, requiring the Indiana courts to strain the substantive elements of
common law fraud. Moreover, this characterization imposes a hardship on
defendants in actions for negligent misrepresentations who thus lose their
defense of contributory negligence. In an increasingly litigious world, the
hardship imposed by the Indiana formulation affects accountants, attorneys
and other professionals who make their livings through the tender of informa-
tion, by subjecting them to continuous potential liability when rendering ex-
pert advice or opinions. This result is neither doctrinally nor socially compell-
ed.
Although actions for fraud and negligent misstatment have a common
basis in tort law, specifically misrepresentation, they are conceptually dif-
ferent in two fundamental respects. First, fraud is an intentional tort while a
misrepresentation made without scienter generally falls within the law of
negligence. s Second, fraud is a breach of a negative duty to avoid intentional-
ly misleading another, while negligent misrepresentation is a breach of an af-
firmative duty to give accurate information, which arises from a particular
relationship.4 The common "misrepresentation" denominator apparently has
caused the two distinct actions to be dealt with identically, although proper
treatment demands analysis as separate actions under two of the basic areas
of tort law, intentional wrongs and negligent wrongs. A new focus of analysis
permits distinction of these areas without succumbing to the fears of sanction-
ing deceit currently preventing the Indiana courts from recognizing negligent
misrepresentation as a viable cause of action.
Underlying the law of misrepresentation are fundamental policy questions
concerning the reliability of statements of material fact.5 These questions
must be answered in light of the community's accepted business and social
mores coupled with the recipient's conformity to "accepted social standards of
'The terms "fraud" and "deceit" will be used interchangeably in this note.
2For the purposes of this note, a "negligent misrepresentation" is a statement of material
fact made without intent to deceive and without reasonable ground for belief in its truth.
3W. PROSSER, LAW oF TORTS 704 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER].
F. HARPER & F. JAMES, 1 ToRs, 545 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HARPER & JAMES].
Further, there exist somewhat analogous questions surrounding the tenuous continuum of
materiality and the "law"-"fact" distinction that are beyond the scope of this note.
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propriety and common sense."'8 The essential inquiry concerns the relation-
ship between the parties and involves a determination of their respective
rights and duties.
Privity of contract between plaintiff and defendant or any other special
relationship which would give rise to an affirmative duty will not be required
as a condition of plaintiffs damage recovery for defendant's fraud.7 Under
the general law of torts, fraud is an intentional wrong, insofar as defendant's
dishonesty lies in his stating, as true, facts which he does not honestly know to
be true for the purpose of inducing action on the part of another." Where
liability is predicated on intent, there is no duty on the part of the defrauded
party to use care in relying upon defendant's honesty, 9 and the contributory
negligence defense is not available.10 This is consistent with the general rule
that negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to an intentional tort." While
plaintiffs reliance must be "justifiable," the cases suggest reliance is
justifiable when the relying party subjectively believes he is justified in so rely-
ing (as distinguished from the objective contributory negligence standard).
This subjective test sustains a right to rely unless the facts indicate that the
statement was obviously false 2 or the plaintiff made an investigation
unhampered by the influence of the defendant. 3 The representee is under no
duty to investigate unless he is put on notice of the falsity of the statement.4
On the other hand, an action for negligent misrepresentation, which is
based on a representation made with no reasonable grounds for belief in its
truth, rests on different principles. The defendant should be able to interpose
the affirmative defense of contributory negligence", or to show that the rela-
tionship between the parties did not require an affirmative duty on the part
of defendant to use reasonable care to protect plaintiff.1 8
The purpose of this note is to examine and illustrate this misclassification
under the Indiana law of fraud with particular emphasis on the confusion
OHARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 539.
'HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 537.
'The intentional wrong of fraud should be confined to situations where defendant either
knew of the falsity of the statements or was cognizant that he did not know whether they were
true or false. In either case, he does not honestly know the statements to be true.
'See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 716-17 (citing, inter alla, Teter v. Schulz, 110 Ind. App.
541, 39 N.E.2d 802 (1942)). As Prosser maintained:
It is a sufficient indication that the person deceived is not held to the standard of
precaution, or of minimum knowledge, or of intelligent judgment, or the hypothetical
reasonable man, that people who are exceptionally gullible, superstitious, ignorant,
stupid, dimwitted, or illiterate, have been allowed to recover when the defendant knew
it, and deliberately took advantage of it.
"0See, e.g., Gonderman v. State Exch. Bank, Roann, __ Ind. App. -, 334 N.E.2d
724, 729 (1975).
"See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 426.
"2RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 541 (1938).
"Isd. § 547.
141d. § 541, Comment a.
"See, e.g., Garapedian, Inc. v. Anderson, 92 N.H. 390, 31 A.2d 371 (1943).
16HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 538.
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surrounding the distinction between fraud and negligent misrepresention. It is
submitted that a cause of action for fraud should be strictly limited to situa-
tions where all of its elements are satisfied or legitimately imputed and that a
cause of action for negligent misrepresentation should be recognized, with its
appurtenant affirmative defenses, in situations where the relationship of, the
parties is such as to require the representing party to meet an affirmative du-
ty to be accurate in his representations.
COMMON LAW BACKGROUND
The modem law of fraud was established in 1789,17 in Pasley v.
Freeman, ' 8 where defendant's misrepresentation, made with intent to defraud
and relied upon by plaintiff to his damage, was held to constitute a cause of
action.' 9 Legal scholars of the day assumed that a remedy in fraud would also
lie for negligent misrepresentation'0 until the House of Lords' 1889 landmark
decision, Derry v. Peek,21 separted the elements of negligent misrepresenta-
tion from factors constituting fraud. In Derry, the directors of a corporation
issued to the public a misleading prospectus upon which plaintiff relied to his
detriment. The plaintiff argued that, notwithstanding defendants' belief in
the truth of their representations, they would still be liable in damages for
fraud if there existed no reasonable grounds for their belief, that is, if they
had made negligent misrepresentations. However, the court rejected this
argument, holding that an action for fraud required demonstration of a false
representation "made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3)
recklessly, careless whether it be true or false."' 2 The Derry framework, fun-
damental to contemporary analysis, thus set a threshold requirement of ac-
tual and honest belief in the truth of a representation. Nothing less will pro-
vide a full defense to a charge of fraud. Therefore, negligent misrepresenta-
tions, honest statements made without reasonable grounds to believe them to
be true, satisfy the above criteria and do not constitute fraud.
The New York courts adopted and developed the Derry distinction bet-
ween fraud and negligent misrepresentation,I s  recognizing negligent
misrepresentation as a viable independent cause of action 4 by separating the
"See PROSSER, supra note 3, at 685.
1"100 Eng. Rep. 450 (K.B. 1789).
11d. at 457-58.
"0PROSSER, supra note 3, at 699; Smith, Liability for Negligent Language, 14 HARv. L.
REV. 184, 191 (1900).
2114 App. Cas. 337 (1889).
22Id. at 374, per Lord Herschell. The factual case made out by plaintiff in Derry v. Peek
was as follows: (1) defendants volunteered a written statement of fact to plaintiff and his class;
(2) the statement was not true in fact; (3) defendants, though believing the statement, had no
reasonable ground for such belief and would not have entertained it if they had exercised
reasonable care to determine its truth.
"3See, e.g., Briggs, Blitman & Posner v. New York State Thruway Auth., 28 Misc. 2d 110,
217 N.Y.S.2d 806 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
'See, e.g., Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
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fraud elements of scienter and justifiable reliance from duty of care and con-
tributory negligence. They also recognized the necessity of limiting liability
short of the standard rule of foreseeable plaintiffs in negligent misrepresenta-
tion cases,25 to only those the speaker has purpose to reach and influence and
those he has reason to expect will be influenced. 26
The potential dangers inherent in overlapping fraud and negligent
misrepresentation were discussed in the celebrated case of Ultramares Cor-
poration v. Touche.27 Defendant accountants prepared a favorable but inac-
curate balance sheet for a bankrupt businessman to obtain credit. The New
York of Appeals rejected plaintiff creditors' negligence action in the absense
of privity between the creditors and the accountants, reasoning that recovery
for such negligence would require the creation of an affirmative duty to make
accurate representations to unknown and possibly unforeseen parties, which
obligation would approximate the negative duty to refrain from fraud. 28
Thus, the New York court recognized the necessity of a special relationship
existing between the parties in order to mandate an affirmative duty to have
reasonable grounds to believe the representations made to be true.
Since Ultramares, many jurisdictions, by statute29 or case law,30 have
allowed damage remedies for negligent misrepresentations when a special
relationship exists.31 By contrast, Indiana courts do not recognize a cause of
action based upon negligent misrepresentation,3 2  but deem certain
statements, made without reasonable grounds to believe them to be true, to
be constructively fraudulent.3
25 Note, Negligent Misrepresentation, 13 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 250. 255 (1964).
2'Prosser, Misrepresentation and Third Persons, 19 VAND. L. REV. 231, 255 (1966).
27255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
21 A recovery for fraud was permitted, however, because the statement represented fact as
true to the knowledge of the accountants, which the court held to be a reckless misstatement:
"The defendants certified as a fact, true to their own knowledge, that the balance sheet was in
accordance with the books of account. If their statement was false, they are not to be exonerated
because they believed it to be true." Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
2See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 1710, subd. (2) (West 1973); Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal.
3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1977).
In California, negligent misrepresentation is given statutory recognition as a form of deceit;
hence, broad statements to the effect that scienter is an element of every cause of action for
deceit and that an intent to deceive is essential, are untrue, since neither is a requisite for
negligent misrepresentation. Hale v. George A. Hormel & Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 73, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 144 (1975).
30E.g., Williams v. Polgar, 391 Mich. 6. 215 N.W.2d 149 (1974). It is apparent that many
of the courts that have considered analogous situations have thought the potential liability of one
who negligently supplies inaccurate information to be such as to militate against imposing liabili-
ty when the person ultimately damaged was one whose reliance on the information might have
been called "foreseeable," but have been willing to impose liability when the reliance of the third
party might have been said to be "known." See generally, National Say. Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S.
195 (1880).
"See text accompanying notes 64-71 infra.32Smart & Perry Ford Sales v. Weaver, 149 Ind. App. 693, 698, 274 N.E.2d 718, 721
(1971).
"Id. A key difference between fraud and negligent misrepresentation is the latter's lack of
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Apparently due to judicial failure to distinguish two distinct legal con-
cepts within tort law, intentional wrongs (actual fraud) and negligent wrongs
(negligent misrepresentations), 3' the case law in Indiana has focused on
misrepresentation as determinative of the nature of the action, although the
parties' relationship governs their rights and duties providing the ideal basis
for determining the nature of the cause of action. Although there are limits
beyond which each type of liability should not be carried,35 the Indiana
courts have treated all liability for loss in cases arising from reliance upon
misrepresentations as fraud, either actual or constructive. Analysis of the two
distinct concepts involved in the laws of misrepresentation will illustrate the
confusion surrounding the actions and the inherent unfairness of the Indiana
approach. By contrast, the suggested focus on relationship highlights the per-
tinent obligations and justifiable expectations of the parties, making it ob-
vious that negligent misrepresentations belong under negligence law, and not
under the law of fraud.
ACTUAL FRAUD
Under the framework of Derry v. Peek, an intentional misrepresentation
made to induce another to part with property or to surrender some legal
right and having that effect, constitutes the intentional tort 6 of actual
fraud.37 Indiana recognizes the standard elements of actionable fraud:
representation of a material fact, justifiable reliance thereon, falsity of the
representation, scienter, deception and injury.3 8 However, the lack of suscep-
tibility to definition and the substantial internal overlap of these elements
have contributed to the confusion demonstrated by the Indiana courts in
dealing with fraud. 3
The scienter requirement mandates actual knowledge of the falsity of the
representation or substantial ignorance of its truth'" in order for a fraud to
have been committed. It is this element that gives fraud its intentional
sdenter and intent to deceive. See text accompanying notes 38-40 infra. The Indiana courts have
held that scienter is an essential element to relief for a misrepresentation-based cause of action.
'
4 Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent, and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24
ILL. L. REv. 749, 752 (1930).
3'Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42 HARV. L. REv. 773
(1927).
UPROSSER, supra note 3, at 700.
3
7E.g., Coffey v. Wininger, 156 Ind. App. 233, 296 N.E.2d 154 (1973) (fraud may be ac-
tual or constructive); Hutchens v. Hutchens, 120 Ind. App. 192, 91 N.E.2d 182 (1950).
"1E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Dorr, 140 Ind. App. 442, 218 N.E.2d 158 (1966).
"See, e.g., Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Smith, 131 Ind. App. 454, 166 N.E.2d 341
(1960), evidencing the Indiana courts' confusion.
"Id. at 467, 166 N.E.2d at 348. For example, if defendant induces plaintiff to invest in a
gas-drilling scheme by untruthfully representing to him that defendant had already invested his
own funds in the project, and in reliance plaintiff invests and loses a substantial amount of
money, it is clear that all the elements of actual fraud are satisfied. Gonderman v. State Exch.
Bank, Roann, __ Ind. App. - , 334 N.E.2d. 724 (1975).
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nature; without its actual or legitimately imputed presence, there can be no
fraud.
Also within the fraud requirements of Dery v. Peek is the situation
where defendant induces plaintiff to act to his detriment by representing
material facts as true when defendant is cognizant that he does not know
whether the facts are actually true or false. 41 He obviously does not "honestly
know" the statements to be true and therefore his representation is deemed to
be made recklessly. 42 The Indiana courts have held that such unconcern for
the truth provides basis for an "imputation of scienter." 43 This result is consis-
tent with the general tort doctrine, and with Dery v. Peek, that reckless,
wilful or wanton conduct implies moral turpitude and is "so far from a pro-
per state of mind that it is treated in many respects as if it were so in-
tended." 44
While caveat emptor no longer controls, it must be recognized that the
interests of parties to business transactions are naturally adverse, since each
party is vying for the most advantageous position at the other's expense. The
relationship between the two parties permits a plaintiff, exercising the
minimum caution the law requires, to expect honesty and non-reckless
behavior from the defendant, but no more.4 Plaintiff may not rely upon the
competence 6 of defendant and a fortiori may not rely upon the information
imparted as being warranted or accurate. 47 Therefore, the intentional tort of
fraud should be strictly limited to situations where all the fraud elements are
satisfied. Inference of scienter in cases outside the Derry framework leads to
eccentric and doctrinally unsupported operation of the law of fraud. 48
41Capitol Dodge Inc. v. Haley, 154 Ind. App. 1, 288 N.E.2d 766 (1972).4
2See text accompanying note 22 supra.
4 Capitol Dodge Inc. v. Haley, 154 Ind. App. 1, 6, 288 N.E.2d 766, 769 (1972).44 PROSSER, supra note 3, at 184.45See generally Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. Rzv. 749 (1930).
41In this context, "competence" means having sufficient judgement, knowledge and skill to
make an accurate representation.
47See Green, Deceit, 16 VA. L. REv. 749 (1930).
OThe Indiana courts have extended the inference of scienter to situations outside of the
Derry framework where defendant has put emphasis upon certainty of knowledge by making un-
qualified statements of fact, Grissom v. Moran 154 Ind. App. 419, 290 N.E.2d 119 (1972). The
reasoning behind such decisions is that business ethics jusitfy the recipient's reliance not only
upon the honesty and lack of recklessness of the person making the statement, but also upon the
truth of the facts stated, notwithstanding the speaker's objective belief in their truth, HARPER &
JAMES, supra note 4, at 551. By implying certainty, the speaker has elevated his relationship with
the recipient to one requiring his conformance with an affirmative duty to be accurate.
Therefore, the speaker must guarantee the truth of such facts under a warranty theory. Cf.,
Williston, Liability for Honest Misrepresentation, 24 HARV. L. REv. 415 (1911) (Williston posits a
remedy in warranty theory, under contract law, for negligent speech). If liability is to be impos-
ed, it should be recognized as liability without fault under a warranty theory-it is both a fallacy
and unnecessary to attempt to supply a fictitious scienter; scienter is neither present nor required.
While warranty is usually treated as contractual in nature, liability for a breach thereof was
first recognized in the action of deceit before the beginnings of modem contract law in the action "
of assumpsit, See Carpenter, Responsibility for Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REv. 749, 761
(1930).
[Vol. 53:559
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NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION
Outside the fraud framework of Derry are situations in which the parties'
relationship alone raises an affirmative duty on the part of one or both par-
ties to employ reasonable care to avoid misleading the other. 49 Their relation-
ship dictates that a party may reasonably assume that the communicating
party "is reasonably qualified to make such statements and that he has
employed reasonable diligence to ascertain their accuracy" 0 and therefore
will not make negligent misrepresentations, statements for which he has no
reasonable basis in fact. The law should require the communicating party to
fulfill the relying party's expectations or be liable for adverse consequences.
The foregoing defines the communicating party's affirmative duty to be
accurate in his representations, and negligent deviations from this duty
should be dealt with under the law of negligence. It is here, however, where
the Indiana courts, have ruled that "if the defendant professed to be an ex-
pert and . . . induced the plaintiff to rely upon his superior judgment or
skill," a relationship raising an affirmative duty to be accurate, then a case of
constructive fraud results from subsequent misrepresenations made within the
scope of the relationship.5 1
Constructive fraud has been described by the Indiana courts as fraud
which arises by operation of law from "acts or (a) course of conduct which, if
sanctioned by law, would either in the particular case or in common ex-
perience, secure an unconscionable advantage" to the actor, 52 and thereby
acts as a device to prevent unjust enrichment. 5 The doctrine as applied by
the Indiana courts is quite broad and amorphous as evidenced by its defini-
tion as a "breach of a legal or equitable duty which the law declares
fraudulent because of its tendency to deceive others, to violate public or
The Indiana courts, in the interest of doctrinal consistency should therefore refrain from
vainly searching for a means to escalate this action to the realm of fraud by the inference of
scienter. Instead the action must be categorized under the law of strict liability.
In practical application the defense of contributory negligence will be foreclosed to the
defendant in such a strict liability situation anyway, thus misclassification of the action as fraud
does not work a substantial hardship upon defendants but the justifiability of the recipient's
reliance must be "determined largely by what the preponderant mass of men in fact do in . . .
situations," HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 553, where they have been induced to rely upon
statements as true by unqualified statements of fact. Recipients of information have a right to re-
ly if the "exercise of reasonable prudence does not dictate otherwise." Soft Water Utils. Inc. v.
LeFevre, - Ind. App. - , 308 N.E.2d 395, 398 (1974).
49E.g., the relationship of: principal-agent, physician-patient, attorney-client or any rela-
tionship wherein one of the parties induces the other to rely upon the former's "superior judge-
ment or skill." Smart & Perry Ford Sales, Inc. v. Weaver, 149 Ind. App. 693, 698, 274 N.E.2d
718, 722 (1971).50HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 545.
5 Smart & Perry Ford Sales Inc. v. Weaver, 149 Ind. App. 693, 698, 274 N.E.2d 718, 722
(1971).5 Brown v. Brown, 235 Ind. 563, 568, 135 N.E.2d 614, 616 (1956).
53J. Eaton, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDFNCE 292 (Throckmorton's 2d ed. 1923).
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private confidence, or to injure public interests."5' 4 It may exist without the
presence of either moral guilt"" or intent to defraud"6 on the part of the
fraud-feasor.
Application of this broad test for constructive fraud permits negligent
misrepresentations to be encompassed within a category of fraud under the
eccentric operation of the doctrine, by the imputation of a fraudulent pur-
pose, 57 even though the statements may have been only negligently inac-
curate. By the same token, however, injuries from negligent misrepresenta-
tions may go unremedied under this approach. If the representing party
derives no unjust enrichment from the other party's reliance, there is no con-
structive fraud and therefore no relief.58 Thus the Indiana approach is, in a
sense, both over-inclusive and under-inclusive in its treatment of negligent
misrepresentation.
As a consequence of treating negligent misrepresentation as constructive
fraud, the defendant loses his affirmative defense of contributory negligence
in relying upon the accuracy of the misrepresentations.5 9 Foreclosing the con-
tributory negligence defense by imputing fraudulent purpose in such cases has
been justified by the Indiana courts with the policy statement that "the design
of the law is to protect the weak and credulous from the wiles and stratagems
of the artful and cunning, as well as those whose vigilance and security
enable them to protect themselves."60 However, as applied, this policy fails to
provide appropriate results because of the under-inclusive operation of the
doctrine and the unfairness inherent in foreclosing the contributory
negligence defense. In attempting to resolve the dilemma of deterring
dishonesty without encouraging negligence and inattention to one's own in-
terests, the Indiana courts have found fraud deterrence the less objectionable
end61 and have established that one who is misled by a negligent misrepresen-
tation is not barred by his failure to utilize his own equal opportunity to
discover its inaccuracy. 62
Further, by classifying negligent misrepresentations under the doctrine of
constructive fraud, the Indiana courts have disregarded the specific caution
54McKinley v. Overbay, 132 Ind. App. 272, 281, 177 N.E.2d 389, 593 (1961).
55Id.
'6See Coffey v. Wininger, 156 Ind. App. 233, 239, 296 N.E.2d 154, 159 (1973).
57Id. at 240, 296 N.E.2d at 159.
-SVoelkel v. Tohulka 236 Ind. 588, 599, 141 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1957), cert. denied 355 U.S.
891 (1957).
"See, e.g., Grenier v. Harley, 250 F.2d 559, 544 (9th Cir. 1957).
"Ingalls v. Miller, 121 Ind. 188, 191, 22 N.E. 995, 995 (1889).
68 In Grissom v. Moran, where the intent to defraud had been inferred from the representa-
tion's lack of qualification, the court said that: "While the person relying is bound to use or-
dinary care and diligence to guard against the fraud . . . the requirement of reasonable
prudence in business transactions is not carried to the extent that the law will ignore an inten-
tional fraud practiced upon the unwary." 154 Ind. App. 419, 429, 290 N.E.2d 119, 124 (1972).
62Voelkel v. Tohulka 236 Ind. 588, 599, 141 N.E.2d 344, 349 (1957), cert. denied 355 U.S.
891 (1957).
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enunciated in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche against making liability for
negligent misrepresentations coterminous with liability for. fraud.6 3 While
there is the general negative duty of care the law imposes upon everyone to
refrain from unduly exposing others to harm, this duty is not breached by an
honest but negligent misstatement of fact.
The proper inquiry in a case of misrepresentation should be one directed
to the nature of the services provided by the person making the representa-
tions and the relationship he has with the relying party. If the person pro-
vides services requiring special competence or if he occupies the capacity of
one supplying special information, he should be held to that standard of
competence commensurate with his position."4 It is this special competence
that has attracted those who deal with such a person, and the law should im-
press upon him the affirmative duty, arising out of the relationship between
himself and the party receiving the information, to exercise care and
diligence in the representations he makes.65 If he willfully or recklessly
breaches this duty, he has committed fraud. But if he has merely made
statements without reasonable grounds for believing them to be true, he has
not committed fraud, actual or constructive. Any cause of action against him
should be dictated by the law of negligence.66
The standard to be met under the proposed negligent misrepresentation
formula is that of the degree of care a reasonably prudent man in the plain-
tiffs position has a right to expect from the defendant according to
customary business practices predicated upon their relationship.67 While the
plaintiff has a right to expect that the defendant will be honest in his
representation,"s the defendant's duty to be accurate depends on the nature
of his business and his relationship, contractual or otherwise,6 9 with the plain-
tiff. Thus, the reasonable expectation of care may arise from the personal
relationship of the parties70 or from the peculiar nature of the transactions. 71
Further, while it may be sound to reject as a defense to an actual fraud
action that the defrauded party ought not to have trusted the defendant or
was negligent in so doing, the policy goes too far when it constrains the
:3255 N.Y. 170, 185, 174 N.E. 441, 447 (1931).
4See id. at 183-84, 174 N.E. at 446:
There is a class of cases where a person within whose special province it lay to know a
particular fact, has given an erroneous answer to an inquiry made with regard to it by
a person desirous of ascertaining the fact for the purpose of determining his course ac-
cordingly, and has been held bound to make good the assurance he has given.
"For example, the duty would surely arise if the information was provided in the course of
the defendant's business "for the guidance of others in their business transactions." See RESTATE.
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §552 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
6 Id.
7HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 548.
"The law imposes a general duty of honesty. HARPER & JAMES, supra note 4, at 542.
eSee text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
70E.g., fiduciary, extraordinary inducement to rely.
71E.g., expert knowledge in the exclusive possession of the defendant.
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defense to an action based upon a negligent misrepresentation. When a per-
son embarks upon a business transaction, he, in reality as well as in the law,7 2
is expected to exercise reasonable prudence and not to rely upon those with
whom he deals to protect and care for his interests. The fraud deterrence
policy should not be permitted to thwart the availability to such defendants
of the contributory negligence defense. Indeed, no such result is mandated.
The American Law Institute, in it Restatements of Torts7" has provided
for a remedy for such a negligent misrepresentation, fundamentally rooted in
the law of negligence rather than that of fraud. Moreover, the Restatement
(Second) also provides for a defense of contributory negligence to a charge of
negligent mistrepresentation. 74 The Indiana courts should adopt this portion
of the Restatement to permit reasoned decision-making and fairness in the
law of misrepresentation. Those who are entitled to rely upon the accuracy of
representations, written or oral, must have remedies for material inaccuracies
in those certificates, reports or other media of information. However, the
sacrifice of the theoretical underpinnings of the law of misrepresentation and
the affirmative defenses that should be available to one honestly mistaking
fact exacts too high a price for such protection.
"See, e.g., Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1977).
13(1) One who, in the course of his business, profession or employment, or a transac-
tion in which he has a pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance
of others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for pecuniary loss caused
to them by their justifiable reliance upon such informtion, if he fails to exercise
reasonable care or competence in obtaining or communicating the information.
(2) Except as stated in subsection (3), the liability stated in subsection (1) is limited
to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he knows
the information to be intended; and
(b) which it is intended to influence his conduct.
(3) The liability of one who is under a public duty to give the information extends
to loss suffered by any of the class of persons for whose benefit the duty is created, in
any of the transactions in which it is intended to protect them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964), somewhat modifying the ap-
proach taken in the earlier Restatement:
One who in the course of his business or profession supplies information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused
to them by their reliance upon the information if
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in obtaining and
communicating the information which its recipient is justified in expecting,
and
(b) the harm is suffered
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance
the information was supplied, and
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a transaction in which
it was intended to influence his conduct or in a transaction substantially
indentical therewith.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, §552 (1938).
4
"The recipient of a negligent misrepresentation is barred from recovery for pecuniary loss
suffered in reliance upon it if he is negligent in so relying." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, §
552A (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965).
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MISREPRESENTA TION
Further, the provision of a negligent misrepresentation remedy in Indiana
would be consistent with precedent. In Brown v. Simss the Indiana Ap-
pellate Court found liability of an abstracter to a third person when the
abstracter had prepared, at the request of the owner of the land, an inac-
curate- abstract and furnished it to a third person. Though the facts would
have supported a finding of reckless misstatement of material fact, the court
held that the abstracter owed the ultimate recipient of the abstract, on the
basis of their implied relationship, the affirmative duty to prepare the
abstract with reasonable care and skill and held the abstracter liable for a
breach thereof. 76
In 1965, Brown v. Sims was narrowly construed, apparently restricting its
application to situations where there is privity of contract between the parties
(a far narrower relationship test than in the proposed standard) and where
express provisos or assurances are made as to the accuracy of the statement in
question.7" However, Brown has recently been held as precedent for the still
valid assertion that an "abstracter is liable to his employer for damages prox-
imately caused by his failure to fulfill his duty to use ordinary care and
diligence in preparing the abstract."7 8 Therein lie the doctrinal foundations
for the proposed relationship-based misrepresentation analysis. The employer-
abstractor relationship is quite similar to the relationship between the client
and one who provides services requiring special competence or yielding
special information.
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the express provision of a
remedy for negligent misrepresentation will require the destruction of the en-
tire doctrine of constructive fraud in Indiana. First, the constructive fraud
formula applied in Indiana to instances of negligent misrepresentation is one
of three facets of the doctrine. 79 Foreclosing its application to negligent
7122 Ind. App. 317, 53 N.E. 779 (1899).
16[The abstracter] delivered the abstract to the appellant for his use, and certified it
to be a correct and true abstract of title; and he represented to the appellant, before
he made the loan, that the title was free and unincumbered, and that there were no
liens of the real estate; and the appellant informed the abstracter that he would rely
entirely on the abstract and represenatation; and the abstracter informed the ap-
pellant, before he made the loan, that he could so rely; and the appellant did so rely
in making the loan, having no other knowledge or information. We think it cannot
propertly be said that the appellee did not owe a duty to the appellant arising under
the contract, the attending circumstances indicating that it was the understanding of
all the parties that the service was to be rendered for the use and benefit of the ap-
pellant, the particular person who was to loan his money in reliance upon what the
abstractor should do and represent in the premises. If such a duty did arise, the ap-
pellee was bound to the person to whom he owed the duty to perform it with
reasonable care and skill.
Id. at 325-26, 53 N.E. at 781.
77Peyronnin Constr. Co. v. Weiss, 137 Ind. App. 417, 427-28, 208 N.E.2d 489, 494-95
(1965).
7$Mayhew v. Deister, 144 Ind. App. 111, 118, 244 N.E.2d 448, 452 (1969).
7 ((1) Frauds arising from facts and circumstances of imposiion.
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misrepresentation would not effect the continued viability of the remaining
facets. Second, by analogy, in California, where an action for negligent
misrepresentation was provided for by statute,80 the laws of negligence and
fraud have coexisted successfully with constructive fraud continuing to
remedy instances of unjust enrichment deemed to have detrimental effect
upon public interests.-
CONCLUSION
The law of misrepresentation is a forked road, its two branches cor-
responding with two of the general areas of tort law: intentional wrongs and
negligent wrongs. However, the Indiana courts have treated all cases of
misrepresentation as forms of fraud. This approach not only confuses the
substantive laws applicable to misrepresentation and is inconsistent with the
underlying doctrines shaping the two distinct types of liability, but deprives
those charged with uttering negligent misrepresentations of their contributory
negligence defense.
The proper course of action for the Indiana courts is to recognize the
fundamental differences between the two types of misrepresentation and to
approach cases involving misrepresentation with an eye to! the relationship
between the parties, and the source of their respective rights and duties. This
approach would provide a remedy for misrepresentations negligently made
and would bar a plaintiff who had been contributorily negligent in failing to
discover the inaccuracies of the litigated representations.
DANIEL C. EMERSON
(2) Frauds apparent from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself.
(3) Frauds presumed from the circumstances and condition of the contracting
parties.
(4) Fraud upon third persons not parties to the fraudulent contract.
The first of these classes constitutes actual fraud; the other three, constructive fraud.
J. Eaton, HANDBOOK OF EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 260 (Throckmorton's 2d ed. 1923), citing Lord
Hardwicke in Earl of Chesterfield v. Janssen, 28 Eng. Reprint 82, 100 (1750).
"CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1710, Subd. (2) (West 1973).
81See, e.g., Hale v. George A. Hormel & Co., 48 Cal. App.3d 73, 121 Cal. Rptr. 144
(1975), Gold v. Los Angeles Democratic League, 49 Cal. App.3d 365, 122 Cal. Rptr. 732 (1975).
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